Thinking the Creator and Creature Together’: How Rāmānuja’s Account of Scriptural Meaning Encourages Unitive Language in Christian Discourse about God and the World by OP, Martin Ganeri
Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies 
Volume 31 Celebrating Rāmānuja at 1000: The 
Heritage and Promise of the Study of Rāmānuja 
in a Christian-Hindu Comparative Theology 
Article 18 
2018 
Thinking the Creator and Creature Together’: How Rāmānuja’s 
Account of Scriptural Meaning Encourages Unitive Language in 
Christian Discourse about God and the World 
Martin Ganeri OP 
Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs 
Recommended Citation 
OP, Martin Ganeri (2018) "Thinking the Creator and Creature Together’: How Rāmānuja’s Account of 
Scriptural Meaning Encourages Unitive Language in Christian Discourse about God and the World," 
Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies: Vol. 31, Article 18. 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.7825/2164-6279.1695 
The Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies is a publication of the Society for Hindu-Christian Studies. The digital 
version is made available by Digital Commons @ Butler University. For questions about the Journal or the Society, 
please contact cbauman@butler.edu. For more information about Digital Commons @ Butler University, please 
contact digitalscholarship@butler.edu. 
Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies 31 (2018): 9-17 
‘Thinking the Creator and Creature Together’: 
How Rāmānuja’s Account of Scriptural Meaning 
Encourages Unitive Language in Christian Discourse 
about God and the World 
 
Martin Ganeri OP 
Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford 
 
ABSTRACT: The interest shown by Christian 
theologians in the work of Rāmānuja has 
tended to focus on his doctrinal account of God 
and his embodiment cosmology. This paper 
explores instead Rāmānuja’s account of 
language in general and then those Vedāntic 
texts that grammatically identify the world 
with the ultimate reality, Brahman. It shows 
how Rāmānuja is able to affirm the primary 
meaning of these texts, but in such a way as to 
express the complete contingency of the world 
on the ultimate reality as well as their 
distinction.  The paper goes on to develop a 
theological dialogue between Rāmānuja and 
the Christian Scholastic theology of Thomas 
Aquinas. Whereas Christian theology has 
tended generally to avoid language that 
identifies the world with God as being 
pantheistic and opposed to the doctrine of 
creation, an appropriation of Rāmānuja’s 
account of language encourages the use of such 
unitive language as a powerful way of 
expressing the unique relation that is creation. 
Introduction 
At the heart of Rāmānuja’s theology is his 
exegesis of the Vedāntic scriptural texts.  In 
support of his exegesis Rāmānuja advances a 
number of arguments about how language 
works both in general and in the theological 
context.  And he puts forward a distinctive 
account of the semantic relation between 
language and the reality of entities in the 
world, including the nature of their 
relationship with the ultimate reality, 
Brahman.  A central application of this is in his 
account of those scriptural texts that 
grammatically identify the world with 
Brahman.  For Rāmānuja such statements can 
be taken at their primary meaning without 
denying that the world is distinct from 
Brahman and that it exists as a reality wholly 
dependent on Brahman, as the body of 
Brahman.  It is his account of language that 
enables him to resolve the apparent 
contradiction that this involves.  For such 
identity statements, taken straightforwardly, 
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imply that Brahman and the world form a 
substantial unity, i.e. that they have a 
metaphysical identity.  Yet, Rāmānuja’s 
cosmological account denies such a substantial 
unity.1  
Christian theological engagement with 
Rāmānuja has tended to give more attention to 
his cosmology as a resource for the creative 
enrichment of Christian theology.2   However, 
his account of language is also very interesting 
and in this article I would like to argue that 
Christian theology might also embrace and 
appropriate his account of identity statements 
as a resource for expressing the unique 
relationship that is creation. 3   Christian 
theology has generally shunned such identity 
statements on the basis that they do imply a 
pantheistic relationship, a substantial unity, 
one that is alien to Christian understanding of 
the relationship between God and the world.  
Engagement with Rāmānuja’s account of 
language, however, encourages a creative 
rethinking of Christian accounts of language 
when it comes to this relationship. 
Rāmānuja: language and reality 
The presence of sentences in which the 
world is grammatically identified with 
Brahman is a striking feature of the Vedāntic 
scriptures and the question of how to interpret 
them becomes a major topic in the Vedāntic 
schools. Of particular concern are those that 
identify the finite self with Brahman, such as ‘I 
am Brahman’ (ahaṃ brahmāsmi, 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.10) or ‘That you 
are, Śvetaketu’ (tat tvam asi śvetaketu, 
Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.8.7ff).  For the Advaitic 
school these are taken as affirming a strict 
identity between the finite self and Brahman 
and this then forms the central doctrine within 
Advaita as a whole.  For those Vedāntic schools, 
such as Rāmānuja’s, that affirm that the world 
and the finite selves within human beings are 
distinct from Brahman there is inevitably the 
question of what meaning to give them, when 
their primary seem to contradict the 
distinction being otherwise maintained.  
Rāmānuja’s general account of language 
emerges in contexts where he is discussing 
these texts and serves to give a basis for being 
able to justify his exegesis of them.   
Rāmānuja’s first develops a general 
account of how to understand sentences where 
words of the same case are co-ordinated with 
each other, such as ‘The cloth is red,’ or 
‘Devadatta is dark-complexioned, young, 
reddish-eyed, not poor, not stupid, of 
irreproachable character.’  (Rāmānuja Śrī 
Bhāṣya (Ś.Bh.) 1.1.13). 4   For Rāmānuja it is 
commonly agreed that what characterises such 
sentences is that there is the ‘predication to one 
entity of several words having different 
reasons for their application.’  (Ś.Bh1.1.13). 5  
There is a single grammatical subject about 
which a number of predicates are made and 
these predicates inform us in different ways 
about the nature of that subject.  And in terms 
of their relation to reality, they refer to single 
entities in the world and tell us about what kind 
of entities they are and what they are otherwise 
like.  
Supporting this account is Rāmānuja’s 
argument that there is a structural 
correspondence between language and reality, 
taking the inflected language of Sanskrit as his 
model.  In other words, the differentiation 
present within Sanskrit words constructed of 
verbal roots and their affixes, as well as that 
present in sentences composed of a number of 
words, reflects real differences in entities 
themselves.  As he puts it: 
Language, in particular, is capable only of 
denoting an entity having distinct 
attributes, because it takes the form of 
words and sentences.  For a word is the 
union of a root and an affix.  Because of the 
difference in the meaning of the root and 
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affix, it cannot but make known a complex 
object.  And the differentiation within a 
word is linked to differentiation in the 
object (Ś.Bh. 1.1.1).6  
A second aspect of Rāmānuja’s account of 
language is that he asserts that the reality of 
how entities are determines the meaning of 
language for us.  In the case of the redness of a 
cloth we know that the redness only exists by 
virtue of the cloth.  The redness inheres in the 
cloth.  This Rāmānuja calls the relationship of a 
mode (prakāra). For Rāmānuja this means that 
part of the primary meaning of the word ‘red’ 
is the cloth, in that part of our understanding 
of what ‘red’ means is that it refers to the cloth 
in which it inheres.  Thus, for Rāmānuja, a 
sentence like ‘the cloth is red’ has a double 
primary meaning; first, its primary meaning is 
that the cloth is characterised by the colour red 
and is one entity; second, the meaning is that 
‘red’ is a mode of the cloth, referring us to the 
cloth. 
Rāmānuja extends this account to include 
the relationship between a body and its self and 
to sentences that talk of bodies and their selves.  
The relation of a body to its self is a modal 
relationship, like that of an attribute and the 
entity in which it inheres, since the body also 
only exists as dependent on the self.  So, any 
word for a body also refers us to the self within 
it.  This is also part of the primary meaning of 
the word.  Summing up both his account of the 
meaning of words denoting modes and how it 
relates to the relationship of bodies to the 
selves of which they are the bodies, Rāmānuja 
states: 
Because a body is the mode of the self that 
possesses the body, and because words 
naming a mode terminate in the mode 
possessor, words naming a body rightly 
terminate in the self that possesses the 
body.  For a mode is the part perceived as 
‘thus’ in some entity perceived as ‘this is 
such.’  A word that makes the mode known 
has its terminus of meaning in the mode 
possessor, rightly doing so because the 
understanding of a mode depends on the 
mode possessor, since the mode depends 
for its existence on the mode possessor 
(Ś.Bh. 1.1.13)7 
Rāmānuja uses this account of language to 
support his exegesis of those Vedāntic 
scriptural texts that co-ordinate the world and 
Brahman, in particular the statement, ‘That 
you are, Śvetaketu.’ (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 
6.8.7ff).  For Rāmānuja the Vedānta texts make 
known to us that the world, or more precisely 
each entity within the world, is the body of 
Brahman, who is its inner self.  This is 
something that is revealed to us, rather than 
something obvious to us from observation of 
the world.  But once we do know this, then what 
the language we use for entities in the world 
means for us changes.  Words for entities in the 
world now also refer us to Brahman as the self 
on which they depend for their existence, since 
we now know that they are modes of Brahman 
(Ś.Bh. 1.1.13 M. 57-60): 
Persons untutored in the Vedānta do not 
see that Brahman is the self of all 
individuals and types of beings, and they 
think that the terminus expressed by all 
[substance] words is only the various types 
of being [overtly expressed by these 
words].  But these are in fact only a part of 
what is expressed.  Once they study the 
Vedānta statements they know that 
everything is ensouled by Brahman and 
that all words express Brahman as 
conditioned by various modes, in that 
everything is Brahman’s effect and he is 
their inner controller (Rāmānuja, Vedārtha 
Saṃgraha para. 21).8   
The text, ‘That you are, Śvetaketu,’ cannot 
be taken to mean that the world itself is strictly 
identical with Brahman, since we know from 
3
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revelation that each entity in the world is the 
body of Brahman, distinct from Brahman, 
having its own substantial existence, but 
completely dependent on Brahman for its 
existence.   But, at the same time, the text can 
still be taken at its primary meaning, because, 
in the light of revelation, we now see the 
primary meaning of words for entities in the 
world refers us to Brahman.  Thus, in the 
sentence, ‘That you are, Śvetaketu, the word 
‘you,’ as well as the word, ‘That,’ refer us to 
Brahman.  The grammatical identity within the 
sentence can be upheld, since both words refer 
to Brahman.  Hence, such statements express in 
a particularly emphatic way the relationship 
the world has with Brahman: 
In the case of the co-ordinative text, ‘That 
you are,’ the word ‘that’ makes know the 
supreme Self who is the maker of the world, 
who is characterised by all auspicious 
qualities, whose will is always realised and 
from whom any suggestion of any taint is 
rejected and the word, ‘you’ makes known 
the supreme Self who has as his body the 
embodied finite self (Ś.Bh. 1.1.13).9   
Christian Discourse about God and the World 
Turning now to Christian theological 
engagement with Rāmānuja, I would like first to 
mention a comment made by the 
contemporary Christian theologian David 
Burrell C.S.C.  Burrell became familiar with 
another form of Christian encounter with 
Vedānta, in the form of the work of twentieth 
century Catholic Thomist theologians, who 
brought the Scholastic thought of Thomas 
Aquinas into a sustained encounter with 
classical Advaita Vedānta.  Two of these 
theologians, Richard de Smet S.J. and Sara 
Grant R.S.C.J. argued for a convergence 
between the account given of the Brahman and 
Brahman’s relationship with finite reality 
found in Advaita Vedānta and the account of 
God and of God’s relationship with the world 
found in the work of Thomas Aquinas, based on 
a realist reading of some works of Śaṃkara. In 
the light of becoming familiar with their work 
in the form of a set of lectures given by Sarah 
Grant,10 Burrell has commented in a number of 
his writings that Vedāntic non-dualistic 
language might help us, as he puts it, ‘think 
creator and creature together.’11   
Burrell does so in the context of his own 
detailed examination of Christian Scholastic 
theology’s use of Islamic thought as Christian 
Scholastics sought to find an adequate way of 
expressing the creational relation between God 
and the world.  Both Islamic and Christian 
thinkers were faced by the inadequacy of the 
ordinary causal language describing types 
causation within the world for expressing the 
unique case of causation that is creation.  
Creation is the doctrine that the world is 
produced by God in such as way that the world 
is distinct from God, but dependent for the 
entirety of its existence on God at all times.  The 
world is distinct from God, but does not exist 
separate from God.  The world has a substantial 
existence of its own, but is totally dependent 
for this existence on God.  On the one hand, the 
ordinary causal language of a human craftsman 
making other things can be used to express the 
production of the world by God, but suggests 
that world is separate from God, since the 
things made by craftsmen are separate from 
their maker.  On the other hand, the causal 
language of natural generation or emanation of 
one entity from another thing does expresses 
the total dependence of the world on God at all 
times, but suggests that God and the world are 
one substance in a pantheistic fashion. 
Christian scholastic theologians such as 
Thomas Aquinas sought to combine both  types 
of causal language, interpreting them in such a 
way that the disadvantages of both were 
minimized (e.g. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 
(S.T.) 1.44-45).  For his part, Burrell suggests 
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that we might find in Vedāntic language a 
further resource for expressing the creational 
relationship that helps us express this unique 
relation, one that complements existing 
solutions.  Following his lead, I want to explore 
how Rāmānuja’s own account of language and 
of Vedāntic identity statements can itself serve 
as a kind of catalyst for using identity language 
in a Christian context, without any fear that we 
will end up with a pantheistic account.  
Following the lead of those earlier Christian 
theologians who engaged with Advaita Vedānta 
I will also take Thomas Aquinas as the point of 
encounter on the Christian side and ask of his 
theology whether it can accommodate and be 
enriched by an engagement with Rāmānuja.  
Since the encounter with Advaita Vedānta was 
itself based on a realist reading of Advaita 
Vedānta, this can fittingly be extended to an 
encounter with the realist form of Vedānta 
found in Rāmānuja. 
Aquinas: language and reality 
For his account of language in general 
Aquinas draws on Aristotle and on Aristotle’s 
semantic triangle of entities, words and 
concepts.  Here words are said to refer to 
entities via the concepts of those entities 
formed in human minds.  When we use a 
sentence like ‘Socrates is a human being and is 
wise,’ we have a concept in our minds about 
what a human being is and what wisdom is.  The 
concept is the definition or ratio of what a 
human being and what wisdom are: 
According to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. 
Lib. 1, l.1, n.2) words are signs of ideas and 
ideas the likenesses of entities. And so it is 
evident that words signify entities through 
the medium of the concept the intellect has 
[of the entity].  It follows therefore that we 
can give a name to any entity insofar as we 
can understand it (S.T. 1.13.1).12 
The ratio that a name signifies is the 
concept of the intellect about the things 
signified by the name (S.T. 1.13.4).13 
So, for Aquinas, language relates to the 
reality of the world through the medium of 
human thought.  This means that words and 
sentences are dependent on human agreement 
about what they mean and how they can be 
used (e.g. Aquinas, In Peri Hermeneias Lib. 1, l.2, 
n.5).  
We noted that Rāmānuja affirms a 
structural correspondence between language 
and the reality of entities. Likewise, for Aquinas 
there is a structural correspondence in the 
relation between language and finite entities, 
via the concepts formed about these entities.  In 
a sentence like ‘Socrates is a human being and 
is wise,’ the ratio or defining concept of what 
‘human being’ and ‘wise’ is a mental concept in 
the human being using this language.  But the 
sentence, ‘Socrates is a human being and is 
wise’ is said to be a true sentence only if it 
corresponds to the reality of what Socrates is, 
since truth, for Aquinas, is the conformity of 
the mind and entities, as that is expressed in 
language (S.T. 16.2).  Thus, the ratio of ‘human 
being’ and ‘wise’ is something that can also be 
said to inhere in the entity itself in the sense 
that it is the reality of what kind of entity a 
human being is and what kind of quality being 
wise is.  The different concepts correspond to 
different aspects of the reality of finite 
entities.14   
For Aquinas the exception to this is God, 
whose existence is entirely simple, that is to 
say, not characterized by the forms of 
composition that characterize finite reality.  
For Aquinas we can use certain words that 
denote perfections of existence, such as ‘wise,’ 
of both finite entities and of God and predicate 
them literally both of finite entities and of God.  
Yet in so doing we are speaking analogously, 
since how these words correspond to the 
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reality of finite entities and God is different.  In 
the case of a finite entity, such as Socrates, his 
being a human being and his being wise 
correspond to really different aspects of his 
existence, but in God there is only the infinite 
existence that is God and while to say that he is 
wise does correspond to the reality of his 
existence, this does not correspond to real 
differences in his existence (S.T. 1.13. 2,5).   
We can already see here certain 
convergences between Aquinas’ account of 
language and how it relates to reality and that 
of Rāmānuja.  For Aquinas, when we use a 
sentence like, ‘Socrates is a human being and is 
wise’ we name aspects of what kind of entity 
Socrates is and what he is like and these are 
aspects that inhere in Socrates.  Moreover, the 
human nature of Socrates and his being wise 
only exist because they are found in the 
concrete entity called Socrates.  This is what 
Rāmānuja calls the modal relationship.  So, it 
might also seem natural, after reading 
Rāmānuja, to extend Aquinas’ account and also 
say that when we use these words they also 
refer us to the concrete entity we are talking 
about.  Their primary meaning for us extends 
to that concrete entity on which they depend 
for having existence.   Moreover, in terms of 
God and the world, for Aquinas we know in the 
light both of revelation and human reasoning 
that the world is created by God.  We know that 
the world has been produced by God and 
depends on God for its existence at all times.   
So, we could say that for Aquinas the world has 
a modal relationship with God, in the wider 
scope of that term given by Rāmānuja. 
Now, if we put these things together, I think 
we can see how Rāmānuja’s account of identity 
statements between Brahman and the world 
can be appropriated creatively and usefully by 
a Christian theologian using Aquinas’ account 
both of language and of creation.  We noted 
that for Aquinas words refer to entities via 
concepts and that human agreement 
determines what words and sentences mean.  
In the theological context in which we know 
that the world is created our understanding of 
the reality of the world acquires a new depth.  
And we could agree that the concepts we have 
about things in the world should reflect this 
new depth.  Hence, what the words themselves 
mean for us extends to the Creator on whom all 
the entities we name by these words depend.  In 
this deeper theological context, a word like 
‘human being’ would refer immediately to the 
concrete human being in which human nature 
inheres, but also to the God on whom the 
existence of any concrete human being 
depends.  In effect, this is what Rāmānuja 
himself does.  In the light of revelation he 
expands the concept of what the primary 
meaning of words for entities in the world is.  
Thus, a sentence like ‘Socrates is God’ could 
be made by a Christian theologian, if it is said 
that the concept of what ‘Socrates’ includes the 
meaning that he is created by God.  The 
sentence would mean that Socrates is a human 
being who depends for his existence on God.   It 
would not mean that Socrates is the same as 
God, or has a substantial unity with God.  We 
could think creature and creator together and 
do so in way that upholds both the distinct 
reality of the creature and the inseparable 
relation of dependency that are both elements 
of the doctrine of creation.    
For Aquinas words denoting perfections of 
existence, such as ‘wise,’ can be predicated 
literally, if analogously, of finite entities and of 
God because the ratio or defining concept of 
such terms is not tied to any particular mode of 
existence.  They can characterise both the 
finite and composite mode of existence found 
in finite entities and the infinite and simple 
mode of existence found in God.  Yet with 
words like ‘human being’ the ratio or defining 
concept is tied to finite reality, to the nature of 
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created things, since a ‘human being’ is 
inherently a finite and composite entity.   The 
Bible often does predicate words that denote 
finite or created reality of God, but within 
Aquinas’ understanding of this, such language 
is inherently metaphorical and expresses ways 
in which God is similar to created entities (S.T. 
1.13. ad.1).  For instance, when the Bible calls 
God a ‘rock’ (Psalm 18:2) or a ‘shepherd’ (Psalm 
23: 1) it means that God is a secure refuge for 
human beings to rely on like a rock or is the 
guide, provider and protector of human beings, 
like a shepherd.  Yet, what underlies both 
analogous and metaphorical language is the 
reality that God is the cause of all the aspects of 
existence found in finite entities.   Finite 
entities such a human being only exist as such 
because God causes them to be and they can 
only be wise or good or powerful because God 
causes them to be such.  Thus, a creative use by 
Christian theologians of identity statements to 
express the inseparable relationship of 
dependence between God and the finite entities 
that make up the created world helps make 
manifest something that is already present in 
Aquinas’ wider discussion of how language is 
used of God.     
This creative extension of Aquinas’ account 
of language accords also with ways in which 
Aquinas himself interprets sentences in the 
Bible where human beings are said to share in 
the divine nature.  In terms of creation there 
are few such texts, but they are not completely 
absent and have required Christian exegetes to 
explain how they could be true.  Thus in Psalm 
82:6 it is said, ‘I said, ‘You are gods, sons of the 
Most High, all of you.’  For Aquinas the meaning 
of this sentence cannot be an affirmation of any 
strict identity between human beings and God, 
but rather that human beings have a certain 
likeness to the divine nature.  As he puts it: 
This name, ‘God’ is nonetheless 
communicable [to other entities], not 
according to its whole signification, but 
according to some aspect of it through a 
certain likeness, so that they are called 
gods, who share in an aspect of divinity 
through a likeness, according to the text, ‘I 
said, You are gods.’ (Psalm 82.6) (S.T. 
1.13.9).15 
In other words, human beings share in 
aspects of the nature of God, above all by 
having intellect and will whereby they can be 
said to be made in the image of God.  
In keeping with this, Aquinas explains the 
meaning of texts where human beings and God 
are identified in the order of salvation or of 
grace, sentences that have led to rich spiritual 
language of ‘divinization’ within the Christian 
tradition.  Thus, in 2 Peter 1:4, the promise is 
given that by divine power human beings can 
‘become partakers of the divine nature’ (R.S.V 
tanslation) or in John 17: 21, Christ prays ‘that 
they be one even as thou, Father, art in me, and 
I in thee, that they also may be in us’ (R.SV.) For 
Aquinas these texts do not mean that human 
beings enter into a substantial unity with God, 
but rather that there is a certain assimilation to 
the divine nature through participation in 
divine grace.  It is this operation of divine grace 
that makes it possible to talk of the deification 
of human beings: 
The gift of grace exceeds every faculty of 
created nature, since it is nothing other 
than a certain sharing in the divine nature, 
which exceeds every other nature.   
For it is necessary that only God deifies by 
communicating a fellowship in the divine 
nature through a certain participated 
likeness (S.T. 1-2.112.1).16  
In the first place, this is a metaphorical way 
of speaking, just as the predication of words 
that express concept that have an inherently 
finite or creaturely connotation of God are 
metaphorical, since the divine nature as such is 
inherently incompatible with finite reality.  
7
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Yet, such language does denote the real 
assimilation of human beings to the divine 
nature, insofar as the life of human beings is 
drawn into a fellowship with the divine nature.   
Concluding Remarks 
Thus, a further use of identity statements 
to include the modal dependency advanced by 
Rāmānuja can creatively extend the account 
Aquinas already gives.  It can provide Christian 
theologians working with the Thomist or 
similar theology a resource to ‘think the 
creator and creature together.’  One final 
comment can support such a creative 
appropriation of Rāmānuja’s thought as a 
natural extension of what Aquinas himself 
does.  Aquinas does have an account of how 
Christian theology can engage with non-
Christian thought. 17   For Aquinas, Christian 
theology can take from non-Christian thought 
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